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INTRODUCTION

The Texas Legislature recently passed two bills to combat two forms
of Internet fraud: phishing and spyware. 1 These bills, though a step in
the right direction, leave much to be desired in protecting Texas consumers from the acts of internet scam artists. Texas has neither the
resources nor the jurisdiction to combat most of the fraudulent activities it seeks to prohibit. Instead, Texas should join the push for comprehensive federal legislation to combat these scams.
"Phishing" encompasses a series of activities that are high-tech attempts at social engineering-deceiving a person into divulging confidential information.' In a typical phishing scam, the scammer will
send out an e-mail that purports to originate from a legitimate entity.
The e-mail urges the recipient to visit a website and provide sensitive
personal information. The unsuspecting recipient follows the link provided in the e-mail, but instead of reaching a legitimate website, the
recipient ends up at a website created by the scammer. The first
phishing attempts were fairly unsophisticated, encompassing little
more than a request for personal information. But in recent years, the
scammers have become savvier and have employed the trademarks,
designs, and other graphics of legitimate entities in order to trick potential victims into divulging personal information.
"Spyware" describes any software that collects a computer user's
information and surreptitiously transmits that data to another person.3
The information that spyware programs collect can vary from the
seemingly harmless (for example, the browsing habits of the user, the
1. See Anti-Phishing Act, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 544, § 1, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 1468;
Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 298, § 1,
2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 918.
2. Wikipedia, Phishing, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing (last visited Oct. 18,
2006).
3. Wikipedia, Spyware, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spyware (last visited Oct. 18,
2006).
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web pages visited, or the frequency of internet use) to the frighteningly sensitive (for example, the user's financial account information,
the contents of files on the user's computer, or the keystrokes entered
by the user). A spyware program is typically bundled with another
program that the user intends to install. When the user installs the
intended program, the spyware is installed on the user's computer
without the user's knowledge.
House Bill 1098' created Sections 48.001 through 48.006 of the
Texas Business & Commerce Code.' These sections make several
phishing activities unlawful and provide for a civil penalty against a
person who engages in such activities. The right to initiate a civil suit
is given to the attorney general, internet service providers (like
America Online, Comcast, EarthLink, and others), and commercial
entities or websites that were counterfeited or spoofed by the phisher.
To help combat spyware, the Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill
327.6 This bill created Sections 48.001 through 48.003, Sections 48.051
through 48.056, and Sections 48.101 and 48.102 of the Texas Business
& Commerce Code. 7 These sections prohibit various activities related
to the distribution, installation, and operation of spyware. These sections also provide for a civil suit, which may be instituted by either the
attorney general or any other who falls within one of the statute's enumerated classes of victims.
This Comment will analyze the two bills, comparing the need for
such legislation with the purpose and likely effect of the new Texas
laws. This Comment will argue that anti-spyware and anti-phishing
legislation is valuable and necessary. However, this Comment will
show that the problems of spyware and phishing have an extraterritorial character that will make it difficult, if not impossible, for a state
law to provide effective protection or deterrence. Furthermore, this
Comment will critique the Texas Legislature's opting to exclude consumers from the class of persons who may seek a remedy.
The analyses for both bills will proceed in essentially the same manner for each individual bill. First, the history of the legislation will be
examined. Next, the effects of the legislation will be analyzed, with an
emphasis toward comparing the supposed effects with the likely effects. Then, several shortcomings of the new legislation will be
presented. The analysis will conclude with a comparison of the new
Texas law with the laws of other states and with proposed federal
legislation.
This Comment's structure reflects the separation of analysis for
each individual bill. In Section II, H.B. 1098 (the anti-phishing measure) will be analyzed. In Section III, S.B. 327 (the anti-spyware mea4.
5.
6.
7.

Tex. H.B. 1098, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005).
See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 48.001-.006 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
Tex. S.B. 327, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005).
See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 48.001-.003, .051-.056, .101-.102.
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sure) will be analyzed. In Section IV, the Author will bring the
analyses of both bills together, and then offer recommendations and a
conclusion.
II.

H.B. 1098-THE ANTI-PHISHING ACT

The Texas Legislature approved H.B. 1098 on June 17, 2005; the law
created by the bill became effective on September 1, 2005.8 The law
seeks to protect Texans and deter fraudulent internet activity by providing a civil cause of action against any person who takes part in a
type of internet scam known as phishing. 9 A typical phishing scam
involves a series of activities." ° First, the scam artist (or phisher) sends
an e-mail to a potential victim." The e-mail purports to be from a
legitimate business and requests that the recipient follow a link in the
e-mail for the purpose of providing the business with the recipient's
personal information (identification numbers, financial account numbers, username/password information, etc.). 12 When the recipient follows the link, she is directed to a web site that looks like a legitimate
site, but it is actually a creation of the phisher. 13 To complete the
scam, the unsuspecting recipient submits her personal information
through the fake website, giving the phisher complete access to the
accounts and information that were divulged. 4
A phishing scheme relies on two techniques to generate responses
to a phishing e-mail. First, the scheme relies on the ability to generate
large numbers of e-mails and deliver those e-mails to a large population of potential victims. 5 Being able to send out a large number of emails increases the pool of recipients who might be tricked by the fake
e-mail. To achieve a broad distribution of the phishing e-mails, the
16
phisher uses many of the same programs used by spam advertisers.
Second, the scheme relies on the ability of the content of the e-mails
to elicit a response from the recipients. 7 Most of the phishing e-mails
achieve this end by falsely stating that the recipient's financial accounts or user information need to be verified, or else the accounts
will be terminated.'" As phishers have become more technologically
savvy, they have begun to incorporate legitimate business logos and
8. Anti-Phishing Act, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 544, § 3, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 1468.
9. House COMM. ON REGULATED INDUS., BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 1098, 79th

Leg., R.S. (2005), available at http://www.legis.state.tx/tlodocs/79r/analysis/pdf/hbOl09
8h.pdf.
10. CRIMINAL Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT ON "PHISHING" 1-2
(2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/Phishing.pdf.
11. Id. at 1.

12. Id. at 1-2.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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trademarks to help improve the perception of veracity in the e-mails. 19
Phishers have also used computer programming techniques to mask
the true origin of the phishing e-mail (for example, changing the
header information in the e-mail to make the sender of the e-mail
appear to be from the legitimate entity) and to disguise the actual
address of the destination website.2 0
Over the past decade, the expansion of internet use by consumers
has led to an increase in fraudulent online activities. 2 1 Due in part to
the ease with which information can be transferred over the internet,
one of the burgeoning areas of internet fraud involves identity theftthe misappropriation of a person's personal information used to acquire goods or services without the person's consent.2 2 Although
phishing is by no means an epidemic, the predatory nature and the
highly destructive consequences of the practice have put phishing in
the spotlight compared to other types of internet fraud. According to
statistics compiled by the Internet Crime Complaint Center ("1C3"),
in 2004 nearly 70% of all complaints of internet fraud made by Texas
residents involved online auction fraud, which encompasses misrepresentation (but not non-delivery) of goods purchased through an online
auction. 23 But the report also notes that some of the incidents characterized as auction fraud may be attributable to phishing schemes
where the phisher used the name or identity of an online auction website to trick people into divulging personal information. 4 In such a
situation, the victim's complaint to IC3 might be levied against the
legitimate auction site because the victim still believes that the phishing e-mail was legitimate, making the identification of phishing
schemes more difficult.2 5
In response to the increase in identity theft over the internet, several governmental agencies and industry groups organized to combat
the fraudulent practices and to educate consumers about safe internet
browsing. 26 Working under the then-existing laws, these groups had
some success in prosecuting phishers and other identity thieves.2 7 But
political pressure to pass phishing-specific legislation must have re19. Id. at 1.
20. Id.
21. See NAT'L WHITE COLLAR CRIME CTR. & FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
IC3 2004 INTERNET FRAUD - CRIME REPORT 4, 14, 17 available at http://www.ic3.gov/
media/annualreports.aspx.
22. See id. at 27-28.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id. at 17.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 3-4; see also Anti-Phishing Working Group Home Page, http://
www.antiphishing.org (last visited Oct. 26, 2006) (industry group dedicated to combating phishing activities).
27. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC, Justice Department Halt Identity Theft Scam (Mar. 22, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/03/phishinghilljoint.htr.6 8
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mained, because between the years between 2003 and 2005, several
states considered anti-phishing legislation.2 8
The Texas Legislature believed that "advances in technology have
made current law insufficient to combat acts of phishing." 2 9 The Legislature found that phishing scams had reached 57 million Americans
and imposed a cost nearing $2 billion per year on businesses and consumers.3" Thus, the Legislature determined that it needed to intercede and offer new forms of protection for consumers and businesses
that were being injured by phishing scams. Senator Zaffirini, who in
early 2005 filed her own anti-phishing bill in the Texas Senate, recognized another important cost of fraudulent internet activities: such activities undermine consumer confidence in the internet and discourage
new users. 31 In sum, a new anti-phishing law was deemed necessary in
order to keep pace with the technological innovations that accompanied the expansion of internet use.
The anti-phishing bill was introduced in February 2005 and included
a couple of provisions that did not survive the legislative process. One
provision created a criminal penalty to be imposed on anyone who
violated the act's prohibitions.32 A first violation of the act would
constitute a state jail felony, punishable by up to two years. 33 A subsequent violation would constitute a third degree felony, increasing
the maximum punishment to ten years in prison.3 4 It is likely that the
criminal provision was removed because legislators were worried
about creating another burden on the already over-taxed state prison
system and because they recognized the existence of other available
state and federal criminal penalties for the proscribed activities.35
The other provision set the statutory civil penalty at $500,000 for
each violation. 36 This penalty was reduced to $100,000 in the final
version of the bill. 37 This change was probably made in order to have
28. See CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22948.1 (West 2006); see alsoTex. S.B. 326, 79th
Leg., R.S. (2005).
29. SENATE COMM. ON CRIM. JUSTICE, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 1098, 79th Leg.,
R.S. (2005) (committee substitute).
30. HOUSE COMM. ON REGULATED INDUS., BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 1098, 79th
Leg., R.S. (2005), available at http://www.legis.state.tx/tlodocs/79r/analysis/pdf/hb0109
8h.pdf.
31. See Press Release, Senator Zaffirini Files Internet Legislation (Feb. 4, 2005),
http://www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/senate/members/dist21/prO5/pO20405a.htm.
32. Tex. H.B. 1098, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005) (introduced version), available at http://
www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/79r/billtext/pdf/HBH1098I.pdf (last visited Oct. 13,
2006).
33. HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. HB 1098, 79th Leg., R.S.
(2005), available at http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/pdf/ba79r/hr1099.pdf.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. Tex. H.B. 1098, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005) (introduced version), available at http://
www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/79r/billtext/pdf/HBO1098I.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2006).
37. See Tex. H.B. 1098, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005), available at http://
www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/79r/billtext/pdf/hbOl098.pdf.; see also Amendments to 269
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the penalty comport with the Constitutional prohibition against excessive fines.38 In civil actions, where the burden of proof for the complaining party is lighter than in criminal actions, the need to protect
against excessive penalties is especially strong. 39 Legislators likely felt
that reducing the penalty to $100,000 brought the penalty closer to a
reasonable estimation of actual damages.
A.

Analysis of the Anti-Phishing Act

The crux of the Anti-Phishing Act consists of two sections that prohibit activities related to phishing and one section that provides for a
civil remedy.4"
The first prohibition, in Section 48.003, makes actionable a person's
creating and then using a web page or domain name to defraud another person into divulging sensitive personal information.4 1 In order
to show a violation of this section, the plaintiff must show that: 1) the
defendant had a fraudulent intent, 2) the defendant created and used
a web page or domain name to induce or solicit another person into
divulging "identifying information," and 3) the web page or domain
name was "represented as a legitimate online business" without the
business owner's consent.4 2
The second prohibition, in Section 48.004, makes actionable a person's sending an e-mail that requests the recipient to divulge sensitive
43
personal information and provides a link to a fraudulent web page.
To succeed on a claim based on this section, the plaintiff must show
that: 1) the defendant had a fraudulent intent, 2) the defendant sent
an e-mail to a Texas resident, 3) the sent e-mail was "represented as
being sent by a legitimate online business," 4) the sent e-mail contained a link to a fraudulent web page, and 5) the e-mail directly or
or solicited another person to divulge "identifying
indirectly induced
44
information.
The civil remedy, provided in Section 48.005, is limited to several
classes of persons who may initiate a suit under the provisions of the
Tex. H.B. 1098, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005), http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/cgi-bin/db2www/
tlo/amndsrch/amndsrch.d2w/report?TYPE=B&LEG=79&SESS=R&CHAMBER=H
&BILLTYPE=B&BILLSUFFIX=01098.
38. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. In two cases involving the application of the
Eighth Amendment to punitive damages awards, the Supreme Court held that such
awards should be reasonable in light of: 1) the nature of the defendant's conduct, 2)
the disparity between the award and the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff, and 3)
the difference between the award and other penalties imposed for the same or similar
conduct. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-575 (1996); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003).
39. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 574 n.22 (1996); State Farm, 538 U.S. at 409.
40. Anti-Phishing Act, TEX. Bus & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 48.001-.006.
41. Id. § 48.003.
42. Id.
43. Id. § 48.004.
-71)
44. Id.
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Act.4 5 Standing is limited to the attorney general, internet service
providers, and web page or trademark owners, and further limited to
only those4 6 internet service providers and web page or trademark
owners who can show injury by the phisher's activities.4 7
Under Section 48.005, the plaintiff may seek injunctive relief, monetary damages, or both. 48 The available monetary damages are either
the actual damages caused by the violation or $100,000 per violation,
whichever is greater. 49 But the statutory penalty of $100,000 per violation is granted for multiple violations only if the violations are not of
"the same nature," that is, they do not "consist of the same course of
conduct or action, regardless of the number of times the conduct or
act occurred." 50 Additionally, the plaintiff who proves that the defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of violations of the Act may be
a preawarded up to a treble increase in actual damages. 5 1 Finally,
52
vailing plaintiff can recover attorney's fees and court costs.
A literal reading of the Anti-Phishing Act presents several
problems. The first problem involves a personal jurisdiction issue.
The problem arises from the lack of any territorial requirement in
Section 48.003 concerning the creation of counterfeit web pages or
domain names.53 On its face, Section 48.003 prohibits anyone from
creating and using an internet location to request or solicit personal
identifying information for illegitimate purposes. 54 Establishing personal jurisdiction might create a serious hurdle, especially considering
that less than 12% of internet fraud complaints by Texas residents in
2004 involved perpetrators who also were Texas residents.5 5 But this
prohibition would seem to apply whether or not the creator of the
website established the necessary "minimum contacts" with Texas.56
Of course, it is well-established that a court will not read a statute in a
way that raises a constitutional question when a reasonable alternative
reading is available. 57 Nevertheless, the personal jurisdiction issue
Id. § 48.005.
Id. § 48.005(a)(1)-(3).
Id. § 48.005(a)(1), (2).
Id. § 48.005(b).
Id. § 48.005(b)(2).
Id. § 48.005(b)(2)(B), (e).
Id. § 48.005(c).
Id. § 48.005(d).
Id. § 48.003.
Id.
See NAT'L WHITE COLLAR CRIME CTR. & FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
TEXAS'S IC3 2004 INTERNET FRAUD - CRIME REPORT 2 (2004), available at http://
www.ic3.gov/media/annualreports.aspx (follow "TX" hyperlink under 2004 IC3 Annual Reports by State).
56. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 108-109 (1987).
57. Several cases exemplify the use of judicial restraint to avoid a constitutional
issue. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 180 (2003); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,
T
62 (1932).
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
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could have been avoided altogether if Section 48.003 had been written
with a territorial requirement like the one included in Section
48.004.58
The second problem with the language used in the Anti-Phishing
Act is that the prohibited acts are limited to e-mails, websites, etc.,
that are represented as originating from a "legitimate online business." 59 Unfortunately, the term "legitimate online business" is not
defined in the definitions section of the Act, and thus has the potential
to be read more narrowly than was intended. The term might necessarily exclude governmental entities or religious organizations, leaving
those groups unprotected from the fraudulent and predatory use of
their logos, marks, and names. Use of the term "legitimate online
business" seems especially naive in light of a Department of Justice
report that recent phishing attempts falsely used the names of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Department of Homeland Security.6"
A third problem with the language of the Anti-Phishing Act arises
from the grant of standing to "an owner of a web page or trademark
who is adversely affected .. ."61 The choice of language here suggests
that any owner of a web page or trademark who is injured by a phishing scheme has standing, regardless of whether the injury is related to
ownership of the web page or mark. Because the language focuses on
"who" is affected, rather than "what" is affected, a reading of this
phrase could lead to inequitable results. For example, a consumer
who owns and operates the website "www.not-a-business.com" could
respond to a phishing e-mail, divulge personal information, and suffer
injury as a result of the phishing scheme. This consumer is now "an
owner of a web page ...who is adversely affected. . . ." However, a
similarly situated consumer who does not own a website will not be
able to seek relief under the Anti-Phishing Act.
In addition to the textual problems of the Anti-Phishing Act, several practical problems exist. The handling of a recent case involving
a Texas perpetrator of a phishing scheme will highlight some of the
problems presented and questions raised by the new law. The phishing scheme originated in Houston and was shut down in early 2004
through the joint efforts of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
and the Department of Justice.6 2 In the scheme, a phisher from Houston created two counterfeit websites to trick people into divulging
personal information: one website mimicked an America Online
58. Compare TEX. Bus & COM. CODE ANN. § 48.003, with TEX. Bus & COM.
CODE ANN. § 48.004.
59. See TEX. Bus & CoM. CODE ANN. § 48.003, .004.
60. See CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT ON "PHISHING" 1 (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/Phishing.pdf.
61. TEX. Bus & COM. CODE ANN. § 48.005(a)(2).
62. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC, Justice Department Halt Identity Theft Scam (Mar. 22, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/03/phishinghilljoint.ht 2
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("AOL") billing area, while the other mimicked a' PayPal account
login page.63 In order to improve the appearance of authenticity, both
counterfeit websites incorporated logos and trademarks from the legitimate businesses and both contained links to internet locations
maintained by the legitimate businesses. 64 Both websites requested
that the visitor submit personal information for the purpose of account verification; once submitted, the visitor's personal information
went directly into the phisher's e-mail account. 65 In order to bait people into visiting his counterfeit websites, the phisher sent numerous
mass e-mails to potential victims. 66 The e-mails purported to originate
from either the AOL or PayPal accounts departments, and threatened
to terminate the recipients' accounts unless the accounts were verified
by visiting the website linked in the e-mail and submitting personal
information.6 7
After learning of the phishing scheme, the FTC sued under the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits deceptive and unfair
trade practices, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which prohibits the
acquisition of a financial institution's customer information through
fraudulent representation to the customer. 68 The FTC won a permanent injunction, bringing an end to the scam that had duped hundreds
of people out of personal information.6 9 The Department of Justice
filed a separate criminal action based on the phisher's fraudulent activities and obtained a conviction against him.7 0
Based on the resolution of the above situation, the most obvious
question that should be asked is: Why is a Texas anti-phishing law
necessary if the federal government is already protecting against these
types of schemes under existing federal law? There are two answers
to this question that tend to justify the passage of the Texas anti-phishing legislation. First, the state law provides an added layer of protection to a specific area of concern should a situation arise where the
existing federal law is not violated or the federal government is unable
or unwilling to sue. However, this argument belies the fact that one
would be hard-pressed to concoct a phishing scheme that violated
Texas law without violating federal law and be able to maintain a local
character which would avoid drawing the ire of the federal government. Furthermore, the argument overlooks the fact that Texas al-

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ready has laws in place that prohibit
generally what the new anti71
phishing law prohibits specifically.
The second answer, and undoubtedly the better justification, is that
the new state law offers an entirely novel mode of protection not
available under existing federal law-statutory damages. The argument would follow that statutory damages serve several important
purposes: 1) providing a stronger deterrent to those who might otherwise become involved in a phishing scheme, 2) reducing or eliminating
the need to prove actual damages, and 3) providing a monetary incentive for businesses to police the misuse of their names, marks, or logos
on the internet. The deterrent argument fails in light of the fact that
most perpetrators are not Texas residents,7 2 many do not even reside
in the United States,7 3 and few will know anything about the statutory
damage provision to be deterred from going phishing. The other two
arguments are more logically tied to the assertion that the new law
actually provides something more than what previously existed, but
those arguments assume that defendants will actually be able to satisfy
the large statutory judgments against them.
Considering a defendant's probable inability to satisfy a judgment
to one of the allowed classes of plaintiffs leads to another shortcoming
in the structure and function of the new law. One of the law's purposes is to protect Texas consumers,7 but no recourse is available
under the new law should a consumer fall victim to a phishing scheme.
The consumer victim, arguably the most injured by the phishing scam,
gets her bank accounts raided and her credit ruined, yet is left with no
remedy under the new law. But an online business stands to collect a
statutory windfall on what can best be described as trademark infringement7 5 or unfair competition 76 created by the phisher's predatory use of the mark, logo, or name of the business. Even assuming
that the consumer can collect restitution from the defendant, the judgment to the online business means that a bigger hand is grabbing for
money that probably is not there.
Arguably the greatest practical problem with the state law relates to
issues of enforcement. The extraterritorial nature of phishing activi71. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE §§ 17.46, .50 (Vernon 2005) (prohibiting deceptive trade practices).
72. NAT'L WHITE COLLAR CRIME CTR. & FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
supra note 55 at 2.
73. See Anti-Phishing Working Group Home Page, http://www.antiphishing.org
(last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
74. See SENATE COMM. ON CRIM. JUSTICE, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 1098, 79th
Leg., R.S. (2005); HOUSE COMM. ON REGULATED INDUS., BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B.
1098, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005), available at http://www.legis.state.tx/tlodocs/79r/analysis/
pdf/hb01098h.pdf.
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (explaining the remedies available to victims of trademark infringement).
76. See id. § 1125 (defining who is liable for misleading representations).
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ties7 7 makes enforcement of this Act's prohibitions seem untenable. It
would be difficult to enforce these laws against perpetrators in other
states, but it would be infinitely more difficult to enforce these laws
against perpetrators in other countries, particularly if those countries
are not cooperative with American investigations or prosecutions.
III.

S.B. 327-THE

CONSUMER PROTECTION AGAINST
COMPUTER SPYWARE ACT

The Texas Legislature approved S.B. 327 on the same date that
H.B. 1098 was approved; the law created by S.B. 327 also became effective on September 1, 2005.78 The new law was enacted to protect
Texas consumers and businesses from the misuse of a type of computer program known as spyware. 79 The term "spyware" encompasses any computer program whose functions consist of monitoring
and collecting information about the use or user of a computer, and
relaying that information to a third party.80 Over recent years, almost
all spyware has been portrayed in a negative light, but many spyware
uses are legitimate and valuable.8 1 Most notably, some forms of
spyware are used by parents to monitor their children's internet usage
or to block inappropriate content.8 2 Still, the abusive and illegitimate
uses of spyware pose serious threats to the integrity and security of
many computer systems and to the confidentiality of computer users'
sensitive information.8 3
The worst types of spyware install and operate on a computer without the knowledge of the user.8 4 The surreptitious nature of these
programs' installation and operation usually leads to greater
problems. When spyware programs operate on a computer without
the user's knowledge, the user will perceive a slowdown in the
processing power of the computer, but will not be able to attribute the
77. Cf NAT'L WHITE COLLAR CRIME CTR. & FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
supra note 55 at 2 (showing the percentage of phishing scams attributable to out-ofstate perpetrators is likely equivalent to the percentage of all types of internet fraud
attributable to outside perpetrators).
78. Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 298,
§ 1, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 918.
79. SENATE COMM. ON CRIM. JUSTICE, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 327, 79th Leg.
R.S. (2005).
80. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Testifies on Spyware (Oct. 5,
2005), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/10/spyware.htm. For more information, see link to
Prepared Statement on webpage.
81. FED. TRADE COMM'N STAFF REPORT, MONITORING SOFTWARE ON YOUR PC:
SPYWARE, ADWARE, AND OTHER SOFTWARE 12 (2005), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/
03/050307spywarerpt.pdf.
82. Symantec Corp.,

Can Spyware Be Stopped?, July 19, 2005, http://enter-

prisesecurity.symantec.com/publicsector/article.cfm?articleid=5854&EID=705.
83. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Testifies on Spyware (Oct. 5, 2005),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/10/spyware.htm (Oct. 5, 2005) (also see link
to Prepared Statement on the webpage).

84. See id.
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slowdown to any program.85 This may lead the user to believe that
the computer is malfunctioning. Furthermore, when spyware programs install on a computer without the user's knowledge, the ability
to remove those programs is hampered and attempts to manually remove the programs may result in computer system failure.86
The following description shows how illegitimate spyware typically
installs and then operates on a computer. First, the computer user will
download an installation executable file for a program that has a legitimate or desired function, such as a pop-up blocker. 87 The download
instructions and specifications for the pop-up blocker program mention nothing about an additional included program, but the
downloaded file will include in its bundle of software an additional
program that will install concurrently with the desired program.88 The
user will not be given the option to refuse installation of the additional
program because the user will not even be told of the installation.89
Once the additional program is installed on the user's computer, it
begins operating-seeking and collecting information about the
user.9" Depending on the purpose of the spyware, the information the
program collects can range from the user's internet browsing habits to
details about financial accounts. 91 The program then either relays the
collected information over the internet or other network to the third
party or stores the information for later retrieval by the third party.92
The third party can use the collected information and the presence of
the spyware program on the user's machine to perform operations on
the user's machine without the user's knowledge or consent.9 3 These

operations can be as innocuous as opening pop-up browser windows
that contain targeted advertisements or as dangerous as changing a
system's security settings.94

In sum, spyware has the potential to be highly damaging to the integrity of a computer system and to the information maintained on
that system. By installing and operating on a computer system without the user's knowledge, spyware can reduce the computer's processing speed.95 By transmitting information over the computer's network
interfaces, spyware can clog the flow of other, more vital information
85. See id.
86. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Prepared Statement of The Federal Trade Commission Before the Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation Subcommittee
on Trade, Tourism, and Economic Development of the United States Senate 6, (Oct.
5, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/051005spywaretest.pdf.
87. See id. at 4.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 5.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 1.
95. Symantec Corp., supra note 82.
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and cause the slowdown of the network.96 By being nearly impossible
to remove from a computer system, spyware can cause the user to
97
unintentionally damage or corrupt necessary system configurations.
Finally, by collecting many different types of information about a
computer user, spyware can become a tool for identity thieves. 98 The
ability of such a small program to wreak such enormous havoc led
many groups, including the Texas Legislature, Congress, and computer industry organizations, to seek effective ways to combat
spyware.
The Texas Legislature was concerned that the "existing law [was]
insufficient to combat acts of spyware. . . . "9 Furthermore, the problem of spyware was already very serious. Citing two studies, the Texas
Legislature noted that nine out ten computers were infected with
some type of spyware and that the average computer was infected by
at least 26 different spyware programs. 10 0 The evidence indicated a
startling need for protection against spyware in order to avoid a "loss
of confidence in the internet and [a] reluctance to engage in online
business transactions." 10 1
A.

Analysis of the Consumer Protection Against
Computer Spyware Act

The Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act
("Spyware Act") is divided into three subchapters.10 2 The first subchapter contains general provisions, the second contains a list of prohibited activities, and the third contains the available remedies for
parties injured by violations of the prohibitions.1" 3
In the general provision subchapter, the law sets forth definitions
for some of the terms used in the Spyware Act.10 4 The most important of these definitions is the one used for "personally identifiable
information." 105 According to the definition, "personally identifiable
information" means a computer user's: 1) first name or initial and last
name, 2) physical address including street name, 3) e-mail address, 4)
credit or debit card number, 5) bank account number, 6) password or
PIN associated with a financial account, 7) government-issued identifi96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. SENATE COMM. ON CRIM. JUSTICE, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 327, 79th Leg.,
R.S. (2005) (committee substitute).
100. HOUSE COMM. ON Bus. & INDUS., BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 327, 79th Leg.,
R.S. (2005) (committee substitute).
101. Id.
102. See Anti-Phishing Act, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 48.001-.006.
103. See id.
104. Id. § 48.002.
105. See id. § 48.002(1).
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cation number, or 8) account balance or history, if such information
personally identifies the user.1" 6
The law also sets forth several entities that are excluded from the
applicability of the Spyware Act. 11 7 Cable and satellite programming
distributors that are governed by federal law are generally excluded
from all provisions of the Spyware Act."0 8 Other providers of computer hardware, software, services, or network communications are
exempted from the application of specific sections of the Spyware Act
if the provider's actions with respect to a computer user's system involves a legitimate or authorized purpose 0 9
The second subchapter announces a list of prohibited conduct and
activities. The first prohibited conduct relates to the unauthorized collection or culling of personally identifiable information." 0 Specifically, this section prohibits a person acting knowingly and with an
intent to deceive, from copying software onto another's in-state computer and using that software to gather the personally identifiable information of the other person."' This prohibition only applies if: 1)
the software uses a keystroke-logging function, 2) the personally identifiable information is correlated with the browsing habits of the user,
or 3) the software searches the computer's hard drive for social security numbers, financial account numbers, or 12account information without the knowledge or consent of the user.'
The second prohibited conduct relates to the unauthorized modification of computer settings or controlling of computer functions. This
section prohibits a person acting knowingly and with the intent to
deceive, from modifying certain internet browser, firewall, or security
settings or from taking control of an in-state computer. 1 3 This section
contains some interesting individual prohibitions. First, the section
prohibits a person from changing the first page that appears when an
internet browser is opened, the default web provider or search engine,
or the list of "bookmarked" or "favorite" web pages."l 4 Second, the
section prohibits "dialer" or "modem-hijacker" programs, which take
control of the user's modem for the purpose of incurring long-distance
or pay-per-dial charges against the user or a third party." 5 Third, the
section prohibits pop-up advertisement windows, whether appearing
individually or sequentially, if the windows cannot be easily closed
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See id.
Id. § 48.003.
Id. § 48.003(b).
Id. § 48.003(a).
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 48.051.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 48.052.
Id.§ 48.052(1)(C).
Id.§ 48.052(2)(A).
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1 16
Fiwithout exiting the browser or shutting down the computer.
nally, the section prohibits modifying a computer's internet access,
use, or security settings with the intent to either steal personal identifiable information
or cause damage to one or multiple computer
17
systems.'
The third prohibited conduct relates to the unauthorized interfer18
ence with installation, removal, or disabling of computer software.1
This section prohibits a person acting knowingly and with an intent to
deceive from copying and using software on an in-state computer that:
1) hinders the user's ability to block the installation of, or remove,
unwanted software or 2) disables, or otherwise renders inoperable, security software installed on the computer. 1 19 Specifically prohibited
are programs that automatically reinstall after removal, misrepresent
that the program will be uninstalled, or proceed with installation or
operation after the user has selected the option to discontinue that
process. 120 The section also prohibits the use of deceptive or randomized file or directory names that would hinder a user's ability to locate
and remove unwanted computer software.1"1
The final prohibitions are located in a separate catch-all section.
This section prohibits a person from intentionally misrepresenting the
need for a software program in order to induce the owner of an instate computer to install the software.12 2 This section also prohibits a
person from copying and executing, or causing the copy and execution
of, computer software to an in-state computer with the intent to cause
that computer's user
to violate one of the prohibitions contained in
12 3
the Spyware Act.
The third and final subchapter contains all of the available remedies
for violations of the Spyware Act.124 The first section provides several
remedies to certain private persons who are injured by violations of
the Act. 1 25 The classes of private persons who may sue under this Act
are providers of computer software, owners of web pages or trademarks, telecommunications carriers, cable operators, or internet service providers. 1 26 The remedies available in a private action under the
Spyware Act are injunctive relief, actual or statutory damages, or both
injunctive relief and damages.127

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 48.052(2)(B).
§ 48.052(3), (4).
§ 48.053.

§ 48.053(1), (2), (4).
§ 48.053(5), (6).
§ 48.055(1).
§ 48.055(2).
See TEX. Bus. & COM.
See id. § 48.101(a)-(b).
Id. § 48.101(a).
Id. § 48.101(b).

CODE ANN.
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The structure of the available private remedies under the Spyware
Act is similar to the structure of remedies available for violations of
the Anti-Phishing Act. 1 8 The plaintiff can recover damages equal to
either the actual damages arising from the violation or $100,000 for
each violation of the same nature.1" 9 A plaintiff who convinces the
court that the defendant's actions constituted a pattern or practice
may be awarded up to three times the amount of actual damages.
Furthermore,
a prevailing plaintiff can recover attorney's fees and
130
court costs.
It should be noted that some differences exist between the damages
available under the Anti-Phishing Act and those available here. The
Spyware Act contains a remedy provision that makes "[e]ach separate
'
violation of this chapter ...an actionable violation."1 31
Additionally,
a special damage provision is included for telecommunications carriers or cable operators that are injured by the "dialer" programs prohibited in Section 48.052.132 This special provision allows a
telecommunications provider to recover the costs incurred in renting
or using another provider's network to transmit the unauthorized
call. 13 3 The special provision also allows a telecommunications provider to recover costs incurred in dealing with customer billing inquiries or complaints as a result of the unauthorized calls. 34
The final section of the remedies subchapter creates a civil penalty
of up to $100,000 for each violation of any of the Spyware Act's
prohibitions and authorizes the attorney general to bring suit to recover the penalty. 3 5 This section also authorizes the attorney general
to seek injunctive relief and entitles
the attorney general to recover
136
attorney's fees and court costs.
One interesting point about the structure of the civil penalty is that
the penalty is bound by none of the limitations imposed by the civil
remedy sections.1 37 Thus, a spyware creator whose programs reach
Texas computers may be liable to the state for $100,000 for each violation, regardless of whether the violations consist of the same course of
conduct or action or whether a single program creates multiple

violations. 138
128. See id. (listing remedies available under the Spyware Act); id. § 48.005(b) (listing remedies available under the Anti-Phishing Act).
129. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 48.101(b)(2).
130. Id. § 48.101(d).
131. Id. § 48.101(e).
132. Id. § 48.101(g).
133. Id. § 48.101(g)(2).
134. Id. § 48.101(g)(3).
135. Id. § 48.102.
136. Id.
137. Compare id. (creating liability for each violation); with § 48.101 (creating liability for each violation of the same nature or same course of conduct or action).
138. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 48.102.
2O
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Several problems that pervaded the Anti-Phishing Act also plague
the Spyware Act. The textual problem evident in both laws pertains
to the grant of standing to web page and trademark owners. 13 9 But
the greater common problems derive from the lack of a consumer
remedy under the new law and from the extraterritorial nature of internet activities. Because no consumer remedy is available under the
new law, a problem will likely arise where the true victims of malicious spyware and resulting identity theft are grasping at the same
shallow pockets as the statutory victim of the spyware. 4 °
With respect to the extraterritoriality problem, consider the following. As recently as November 2004, the FTC has warned Congress
against creating a spyware-specific prohibition."' At that time the
FTC Commissioner felt that the existing law prohibiting deceptive
practices was sufficient to combat spyware because the agency was
able to sue several spyware distributors under the FTC Act. 1 42 Rather
than provide specific spyware prohibitions, the FTC has asked Congress to strengthen the FTC's ability to pursue foreign perpetrators of
all types of internet fraud.' 4 3 The FTC's request includes granting the
FTC the power to share information with foreign investigative counterparts, and to allocate more resources to foreign investigations and
prosecutions.' 44 Another observer compared the likely ineffectiveness of the proposed federal spyware legislation with his impression of
the ineffectiveness of federal spam legislation, noting that "the probthe need for a new law, but finding the people
lem [with spam] wasn't
'1 45
who send spam.'
However, the argument that Congress should not pass new spyware
legislation because the FTC can combat spyware under existing federal law wrongly assumes that the government is the only entity with
an interest and the resources to bring suit. One of the many positive
aspects of the Texas Spyware Act is that certain injured parties do not
139. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. See also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
§ 48.005(a)(2).
140. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
141. Roy Mark, FTC to Congress: Lose the Anti-Spyware Plans, Nov. 5, 2004, http:/
/www.internetnews.com/xSP/article.php/3432111.
142. Id.
143. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Prepared Statement of The Federal Trade Commission Before the Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation Subcommittee
on Trade, Tourism, and Economic Development of the United States Senate at 8, Oct.
5, 2005, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/10/spyware.htm; FED. TRADE
COMM'N, THE US SAFE WEB ACT: Protecting Consumers from Spam, Spyware, and
Fraud - A Legislative Recommendation to Congress, at iii (2005), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/reports/ussafeweb/USSAFEWEB.pdf.
144. FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE US SAFE WEB ACT: PROTECTING CONSUMERS
FROM SPAM, SPYWARE, AND FRAUD - A LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATION TO CONGRESS 16-17 (2005), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/reports/ussafeweb/USSAFEWEB.
pdf.
145. Roy Mark, FTC to Congress: Lose the Anti-Spyware Plans, Nov. 5, 2004, http://
2
www.internetnews.com/xSP/article.php/3432111.
ANN.
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need to wait for the attorney general's office in order to get a remedy. 46 Each of the enumerated classes who may sue under the Act
represents a business entity that will likely learn of a violation through
its customer complaint process.14 7 Because these business entities are
in the computer and communication technology industry, they are
also likely to have the resources and capability to investigate and locate the perpetrator.
To illustrate the new law's reach and its workings, consider a recent
example. In November 2005, a Texas software engineer discovered
that a Sony music CD he played on his computer had automatically
1 48
installed anti-piracy software without his knowledge or consent.
When he attempted to manually remove the software from his computer, his CD drive was disabled.1 49 He posted his findings on his
website and a maelstrom of controversy ensued.1 50 Some who conducted their own investigations of the software and its function claim
that the software hides on a user's computer and monitors the user's
activity then transmits information to Sony over the Internet.15 ' The
creator of the software admitted that the operation of the program
might create a security vulnerability.1 52 In concert with the mounting
public anger over the surreptitious nature of the program's installation
and operation, the Texas Attorney General's office decided to file suit
against Sony under the newly effective Spyware Act. 153 Although
Sony agreed to recall the affected CDs, one report indicates that 2.1
million of the affected CDs had already been sold. 154 Attorney General Greg Abbott indicated that Sony had committed thousands of
violations of the Texas law. 5 At the maximum of $100,000 per violation, Sony could potentially be liable to the State for millions of
dollars.
In order to determine Sony's liability, one should look first to
whether Sony is exempted from the application of the Spyware Act.
Section 48.003 exempts from certain provisions of the Spyware Act a
computer software provider "that monitors or has interaction with...
a protected computer for: ...(5) detection or prevention of unautho146. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 48.101 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
147. See id. The private parties that may sue under the Spyware Act consist of
providers of computer software, owners of web pages or trademarks, telecommunications carriers, cable operators, or internet service providers. Id. Any business that
falls within one of these classifications will likely have a consumer complaint division.
148. Matt Bradley, Sony Aims at Pirates-And Hits Users, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR (Boston), Nov. 9, 2005, at 14.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Liz Austin, Sony BMG Faces Two Lawsuits Over Anti-Piracy Software,
Associated Press, Nov. 21, 2005, at 1.
154. Id.
155. Id.
1Q1
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rized use of or fraudulent or other illegal activities in connection with
a network, service, or computer software. 1 56 An argument could be

made that Sony was the provider of its anti-piracy software and that
the software's function was to monitor the consumer's computer to
protect against illegal copying of the copyrighted content on the CD.
The next step would be to determine which of the specific prohibitions Sony's anti-piracy software violates. The most likely violations
would fall under Sections 48.051, 48.053, and 48.055.157 Whether or
not Sony's actions constitute violations of Section 48.051 would depend on what type of information the anti-piracy software collected
and what method the software used to collect that information.158 For
example, if the software incorporated a keystroke-logging function,
then collecting even the
computer user's first and last name would
159
constitute a violation.

To show a violation of Section 48.053(5) or (6), the State would
have to prove that Sony's installation software was used to hinder the
computer user's ability to remove the software through either the use
of deceptive file names or by changing the software's name or location. 160 Unfortunately this Section does not also include a prohibition
against software removal that damages the functionality of a user's
computer system. Manual removal of the Sony software resulted in
the loss of CD drive function, which suggests that Sony did not wish to
have its software removed from the computer.
To determine whether Sony violated Section 48.055(1), one would
have to look at the language used in the installation prompts or on the
CDs.1 6 1 One news report indicates that Sony's strategy was to allow
1 62

its music to be played only with the software included on the disc,
which leads to the conclusion that the software was essential to playing the musical content. However, the same report indicated that the
software could be circumvented by merely holding the "shift" key
when the disc was inserted.163 The ease of circumvention tends to
show that the software was not actually essential.
An element for all of the above violations is the requisite mental
state. For violations of the first two sections, the State must show that
Sony "knowingly" copied or distributed the software to computer
users, and further, that Sony acted through "intentionally deceptive
means" in the use or functions of the software. 164 The "knowingly"
requirement will be met if the State shows that Sony knew (or conTEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 48.003.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 48.051, 48.053, 48.055.
See id. § 48.051.
See id.
Id. § 48.053(5), (6).
Id. § 48.055(1).
Bradley, supra note 148.
Id.
164. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 48.054, 48.056.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
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sciously disregarded) the facts that constitute the violations. 1 65 Because Sony hired a company to develop the anti-piracy software and
then purposely included the anti-piracy software on its products, Sony
should satisfy the knowledge requirement. The "intentionally deceptive means" requirement will be met if the State shows that Sony intentionally misrepresented or omitted material information or failed
to provide notice of the program's installation. 16 6 But intentional deception will be harder to infer from Sony's actions if Sony can show a
legitimate need for the anti-piracy software.

IV.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

One aim of this Comment was to demonstrate that laws prohibiting
spyware and phishing activities serve a valuable purpose. But the
greater aim of this Comment was to show that a state law is insufficient to govern conduct that is best characterized as a national or an
international problem. In the absence of federal legislation, however,
the best solution for the present is to create a patchwork quilt of state
laws. At least one commentator has suggested that such a landscape
would likely push interest groups to pressure Congress into finally
passing a comprehensive federal scheme of protection against internet
fraud.16 7
My first recommendation is that Texas join the push to encourage
Congress to pass federal legislation that prohibit spyware and phishing
activities. Such legislation could follow the basic structure of the new
Texas laws, but should not be identical. Any federal legislation should
create a hierarchy of remedies and should place restitution to the consumer victims of the fraud at the top of the hierarchy, to be followed
by remedies for the corporate victims.
Whether or not Congress chooses to consider and pass spyware and
phishing legislation, the Texas Legislature should take another look at
the laws it created and fix the problem areas mentioned in this Comment. First and foremost, the laws should include some guarantee to
the consumer victims that their injuries are the most important and
should be provided for first. Second, the laws should be reworded to
ensure that the Legislature's intent is carried out in the courts'
interpretations.
Justin Vaughan
165. Id. § 48.054.
166. Id. § 48.056.
167. See John Farmer, States May Push Congress to Act on Anti-Spyware Law,
RICHMOND-TIMES DISPATCH, Sept. 26, 2005, available at http://www.timesdispatch.
com/servlet/Satellite?c=MGArticle&cid=1031785275846&pagename=RTD/MGArtiA
cle/RTDBasicArticle&path= !business&s=1045855934855.
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